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USING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO REMEDY 
TAX-EXPENDITURE FRAUD 
IAN AYRES† & ROBERT MCGUIRE†† 
ABSTRACT 
  The federal False Claims Act (FCA) may be a tool for combating 
fraudulent claims regarding tax expenditures. The FCA has been used 
to protect the public fisc by imposing liability upon anyone who makes 
a false or fraudulent claim relating to an expenditure of federal funds. 
A substantial share of government spending is implemented through 
tax credits and deductions granted to individuals and entities for taking 
particular actions promoted by the tax code—so-called “tax 
expenditures.” Funds subsidized by such tax expenditures can 
themselves be the objects of fraud. For example, a taxpayer could be 
defrauded of retirement funds that the government has indirectly 
subsidized through tax deductions granted to the defrauded taxpayer. 
This Article explores how the FCA might be invoked to combat fraud 
that targets the recipients of tax expenditures, as well as doctrinal 
counterarguments to such an application. We touch on the potential 
breadth of the FCA’s reach insofar as it encompasses such claims, as 
well as the prospect of using other whistleblower mechanisms to 
achieve similar results. 
INTRODUCTION 
The government can create incentives for private action by either 
granting subsidies or reducing taxes on desired behaviors.1 The 
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1. While both direct subsidies and tax preferences can be used to offer the proverbial carrot, 
by creating rewards contingent upon action, the government may also employ the proverbial stick, 
and instead use contingent punishments to disincentivize failure to act. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Amy 
Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1781, 1782–89 (2015). 
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government “spends” money when it gives individuals and entities tax 
credits and deductions for taking particular actions, because it foregoes 
tax revenue. These so-called “tax expenditures” by the federal 
government have been estimated to cost over one trillion dollars 
annually—an amount that rivals all discretionary direct spending.2 
This Article argues that tax expenditures, like direct expenditures, 
should be protected against false and fraudulent claims. If a health-care 
provider’s fraud inflates employer contributions for medical insurance 
premiums—which are not taxed—the government’s interest is injured 
just as much as it would be in a run-of-the-mill federal False Claims 
Act (FCA) case involving a more traditional form of fraud.3 
Historically, the FCA has been used to protect the public fisc by 
creating liability against anyone who makes a false or fraudulent claim 
relating to a direct expenditure of federal funds. But we argue that the 
FCA might also be used to combat fraud that targets government 
spending in the form of tax expenditures. 
Although taxpayers themselves may defraud the government by 
making false claims for tax credits or deductions, this Article focuses 
on fraud committed against taxpayers by third parties who target the 
government-subsidized funds in the hands of those taxpayers. Such 
“third-party” fraud against taxpayers in their capacity as claimants or 
recipients of government tax expenditures does not just harm those 
taxpayers. It also undermines the government’s programmatic goal in 
granting the tax expenditure in the first place, whether that goal is to 
encourage employer spending on health plans, to promote home 
ownership, or some other public policy purpose. These third-party 
frauds against taxpayers are economically indistinguishable from third-
party frauds against contractors, grantees, and other direct recipients 
of government money.4 In 1986, when Congress enacted the modern 
 
 2. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 3. Knowingly selling the government guns that do not shoot is an example of the kind of 
fraud that is traditionally actionable under the FCA. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2001 (2016) (using this example). 
 4. While tax expenditures are economically indistinguishable from direct expenditures, 
these two forms of financial subsidies are readily distinguishable politically. Unlike direct 
expenditures, tax expenditures are off-budget spending and, as such, are often portrayed as tax 
cuts rather than as spending increases. Because the former is more politically palatable than the 
latter, amending the FCA to explicitly cover tax-expenditure fraud could present Congress with 
a relatively (politically) costless way to generate a nontrivial amount of additional revenue. In 
fiscal year 2015 alone, for example, the government obtained more than $3.5 billion in settlements 
and judgments from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the government. See Justice 
Department Recovers Over $3.5 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. 
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version of the law, it clearly made third-party fraud against contractors, 
grantees, and “other recipients” of federal funds a target of the FCA.5 
Accordingly, we argue that fraud against taxpayer-claimants—who, 
being economically indistinguishable from direct recipients of 
government money, are properly deemed “other recipients”—should 
also be actionable under the FCA. 
This Article explores how the FCA might be invoked to combat 
fraud that targets government spending in the form of tax 
expenditures, as well as doctrinal counterarguments to such an 
application. We touch on the potential breadth of the FCA’s reach 
insofar as it encompasses such claims, as well as the prospect of 
amending the FCA or using other whistleblower mechanisms to 
achieve similar results. 
The Article is organized in three parts. Part I introduces the FCA. 
Part II explains the concept of a tax expenditure. Part III argues that 
claims under the FCA should include fraud relating to government 
spending in the form of tax expenditures. There, we analyze two cases 
that appear to reject the application of the FCA to tax-expenditure 
fraud, use our analysis of the case law to refute concerns relating to our 
tax-expenditure theory, and describe some areas where the tax-
expenditure theory may be used. Finally, we conclude that our 
approach could allow the federal government to extend the anti-fraud 
protections of the FCA to cover for the first time more than one trillion 
dollars of spending that is accomplished through the tax code. 
 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z9YA-JYJQ]. In 2014, 
FCA recoveries approached a whopping $6 billion. See Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 
Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases
-fiscal-year-2014 [https://perma.cc/L6QQ-TYCK]. Because of the relative parity of tax 
expenditures and direct discretionary spending in the federal budget, see infra note 53 and 
accompanying text, it is not unreasonable to imagine that comparable recoveries could result if 
the FCA were applied to tax-expenditure fraud. 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11–12 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438–39, 439 
n.4 (discussing “[f]raud against government contractors and grantees”); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 22 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5287 (“Thus, the Committee intends . . . to overrule 
Azzarelli and similar cases which have limited the ability of the United States to use the act to 
reach fraud perpetrated on federal grantees, contractors or other recipients of Federal funds.”). 
AYRES & MCGUIRE IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2016  1:07 PM 
538 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:535 
I.  HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The law that became today’s FCA was enacted on March 2, 1863,6 
in an effort to combat “rampant fraud in Civil War defense contracts,”7 
through which war profiteers supplied the United States with 
everything from shoddy uniforms to spoiled meat and blind horses, all 
at exorbitant prices.8 The FCA targets false and fraudulent claims and 
includes an ancient legal device called a “qui tam” provision that allows 
a private plaintiff, called a “relator,” to sue on behalf of the United 
States to enforce the provisions of the statute without having 
personally suffered harm.9 
From its inception, the FCA “was intended to reach all types of 
fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the 
Government.”10 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
Congress’s purpose in passing the FCA “was broadly to protect the 
funds and property of the Government from fraudulent claims, 
regardless of the particular form, or function, of the government 
instrumentality upon which such claims were made.”11 In other words, 
the “Act’s primary purpose is to indemnify the government—through 
 
  6. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds Upon the Government of the United States (False 
Claims Act), ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863). 
 7. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. 
 8. See Ron Soodalter, The Union’s ‘Shoddy’ Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2011), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-unions-shoddy-aristocracy [https://perma.
cc/T9J2-2VCJ]. The use of the term “shoddy” to denote “having a delusive appearance of high 
quality” stems from the practice of Civil War contractors selling the Army and Navy clothes made 
out of a kind of rag-wool padding which “when new . . . looked like broad-cloth,” but whose “gloss 
quickly wore off, giving the stuff a bad reputation as a cheat.” Shoddy, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY 
DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=shoddy [https://perma.cc/F3CM-
WPY6]. 
 9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). The term “‘qui tam’ is short for ‘qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,’ which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the 
King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 463 n.2 
(2007). 
 10. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968). 
 11. Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958); see United States v. McNinch, 356 
U.S. 595 (1958). The McNinch court explained: 
  The False Claims Act was originally adopted following a series of sensational 
congressional investigations into the sale of provisions and munitions to the War 
Department. Testimony before the Congress painted a sordid picture of how the 
United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant 
prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war. 
Congress wanted to stop this plundering of the public treasury.  
McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted). 
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its restitutionary penalty provisions—against losses caused by a 
defendant’s fraud.”12 
By providing successful relators with a share of the government’s 
recovery, the FCA incentivizes relators with knowledge of fraud to 
come forward and, if necessary, prosecute cases on the government’s 
behalf. The relator’s share is generally 15–25 percent of the 
government’s total recovery in cases in which the government 
intervenes, and 25–30 percent when the government does not 
intervene.13 
A. Liability Under the FCA 
In order to establish a traditional prima facie FCA violation, a 
plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant presented or caused to be 
presented to an agent of the United States a claim for payment; (2) the 
claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant knew the claim 
was false or fraudulent.”14 
The FCA has historically been used to protect federal funds in a 
wide range of contexts.15 For example, in United States v. Veneziale,16 
the government alleged that the defendant caused certain individuals 
to make a fraudulent application for a bank loan by falsely representing 
that the loan was for home improvements, whereas the actual purpose 
of the loan was to purchase real property from the defendant.17 The 
Federal Housing Administration relied on the false application, among 
other documents, when it guaranteed repayment of the loan.18 A 
partial default on the loan led the government to pay under that 
guarantee.19 The Third Circuit held that “the government, having been 
compelled to pay an innocent third person as a result of the defendant’s 
 
 12. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
 14. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 304–05 (3d Cir. 
2011). Since 2009, presentment of a claim for payment to the government itself has not been 
required. See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Neifert-White, 390 U.S. at 232 (“In the various contexts in which questions of the 
proper construction of the Act have been presented, the Court has consistently refused to accept 
a rigid, restrictive reading, even at the time when the statute imposed criminal sanctions as well 
as civil.”). 
 16. United States v. Veneziale, 268 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1959). 
 17. Id. at 504–05. 
 18. Id. at 504. 
 19. Id. at 504–05. 
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fraud in inducing the undertaking, is entitled to assert a claim against 
the defendant under the False Claims Act.”20 
In Scolnick v. United States,21 the First Circuit held that the 
“endorsement and deposit for collection of a government check known 
to be issued by mistake in payment of an obligation already, in fact, 
satisfied . . . [was] the presentation of a false claim within the meaning 
of the False Claims Act.”22 In this case, the officer of a corporation was 
liable under the FCA for claiming funds from the government on 
behalf of the corporation, even in the absence of any “direct personal 
benefits to the defendant.”23 
In Alperstein v. United States,24 the Fifth Circuit considered 
whether false statements related to a veteran’s application for 
treatment in a veterans’ hospital were “false ‘claims,’ ‘certificates,’ or 
‘affidavits,’ used for the purpose of obtaining payment of a ‘claim upon 
or against the Government of the United States.’”25 It held that “the 
filing of [the] false affidavit and application for hospitalization, 
involving . . . immediate outlay by the Government of substantial sums 
of money and the receipt by the patient of services, facilities, food and 
drugs of substantial cost to the Government, [fell] within the purview 
of the False Claims Act.”26 
In recent years, the size of FCA recoveries has become quite 
significant. A person found guilty of violating the FCA is liable for a 
civil penalty as well as treble damages.27 Enforcement of the FCA has 
 
 20. Id. at 506. 
 21. Scolnick v. United States, 331 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1964). 
 22. Id. at 599. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Alperstein v. United States, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 25. Id. at 456. 
 26. Id.  
 27. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). A person violates the FCA when he 
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval; 
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
material to a false or fraudulent claim; 
. . . . 
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by 
the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of 
that money or property; 
. . . . 
. . . or 
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or 
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enabled the government to recoup more than $3.5 billion in each of the 
last four fiscal years.28 One reason the government’s annual recoveries 
have been so large is that Congress modernized and strengthened the 
FCA in 1986 in order “to enhance the Government’s ability to recover 
losses sustained as a result of fraud” and “to make the statute a more 
useful tool against fraud in modern times.”29 
Among other changes made in 1986, Congress expressly defined 
the term “claim” for the first time, clarifying that “claims” subject to 
the FCA include requests or demands for money or property submitted 
to a “contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States 
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is 
requested or demanded.”30 Congress explicitly chose this language to 
ensure that the FCA would not be limited to fraud perpetrated directly 
against the government itself, but also “reach fraud perpetrated on 
federal grantees, contractors or other recipients of Federal funds.”31 
For example, the 1986 amendments ensured that fraud against private 
intermediaries such as insurance companies, which resulted in 
expenditures by the Medicare or Medicaid programs, would be subject 
to the FCA.32 
Although one express goal of the 1986 amendments was to 
enhance the FCA as a tool for combatting fraud, from 1986 to 2009, 
courts frequently construed the FCA in ways that limited the law’s 
reach. Of particular relevance to our tax-expenditure theory, courts 
interpreted the FCA to require that a fraudulent request for payment 
must actually be presented to the government itself—even in those 
actions based upon false claims made by a third party to contractors, 
grantees, or other intermediary recipients of government money.33 This 
 
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government . . . . 
Id. The four quoted violations are those that we believe lend themselves most easily to addressing 
tax-expenditure fraud. 
 28. See supra note 4. 
 29. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
 30. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, 3154 (1986) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) 
(defining “claim”)). 
 31. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 22. 
 32. The legislative history of the 1986 amendments states that the amendments clarify the 
FCA application to frauds perpetrated against Medicare and Medicaid funds, notwithstanding 
the fact that “claims are not submitted directly to the Federal agency, but rather to private 
intermediaries.” Id. at 21.  
 33. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
see also Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008) (agreeing 
with Totten, and stating that “[r]ecognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at 
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construction did not accord with the intention expressed by Congress 
when the 1986 amendments were adopted. 
On May 20, 2009, reacting in part to such narrow interpretations 
of the FCA, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 
2009 (FERA).34 In the FERA, Congress redefined “claim” to mean 
(A) . . . any request or demand, whether under a contract or 
otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United 
States has title to the money or property, that— 
(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United 
States; or 
(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the 
money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s 
behalf or to advance a Government program or interest, and if 
the United States Government— 
(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or 
property requested or demanded; or 
(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient 
for any portion of the money or property which is requested or 
demanded; and 
(B) does not include requests or demands for money or property that 
the Government has paid to an individual as compensation for 
Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on 
that individual’s use of the money or property . . . .35 
The FERA also removed language from the FCA that courts had 
relied on to require that a claim be presented to the government by an 
intermediary, if not by the claimant, in order to give rise to FCA 
liability.36 
 
private entities would threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute”). But 
see United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(disagreeing with Totten), vacated, Sanders, 553 U.S. 662. 
 34. Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 386, 123 Stat. 1617, 
1621–22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729). 
 35. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012). 
 36. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006) (pre-FERA) (imposing liability on a claimant 
who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United 
States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”), with 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012) (post-FERA) (requiring only that the claimant “knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for approval”). See also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 
10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438 (“This section amends the FCA to clarify and 
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For purposes of our tax-expenditure theory, these amendments to 
the FCA are significant. The changes that Congress made in 1986 and 
reinforced in 2009 clarify that 
liability . . . attaches whenever a person knowingly makes a false claim 
to obtain money or property, any part of which is provided by the 
Government without regard to whether the wrongdoer deals directly 
with the Federal Government; with an agent acting on the 
Government’s behalf; or with a third party contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient of such money or property.37 
Moreover, federal courts have recognized that the FERA 
accomplished what Congress intended—extending the protections of 
the FCA to false claims made against government funds in the hands 
of third-party entities such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, under the 
rubric of their being “contractor[s], grantees, or other recipient[s]” of 
government money.38 
B. The FCA’s Tax Bar 
It is important to note that not all fraud involving tax expenditures 
is capable of giving rise to an action under the FCA. The FCA’s scope 
is cabined by the statute’s jurisdictional “Tax Bar.”39 The Tax Bar 
provides that the FCA does not extend to “claims, records, or 
statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”40 This 
language prevents the FCA from being invoked against taxpayers who 
have themselves defrauded the government by falsely claiming tax 
deductions or tax credits. 
 
correct erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in [Allison Engine Co.] and 
[Totten].”). 
 37. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11. 
 38. See United States ex rel. Adams v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 
2016) (noting that a claim for defrauding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be stated because 
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the post-FERA FCA “defines a claim as a request or demand made upon 
non-governmental third parties under certain conditions,” but affirming the claim’s dismissal on 
the ground that the relator-appellants did not invoke that prong of the definition of “claim”); see 
also United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(recognizing that FERA “arguably extends the FCA to false claims made to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac,” but dismissing the FCA claims on other grounds). But see United States ex rel. 
Todd v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-666-REB-CBS, 2014 WL 4636394, at *10–11 (D. 
Colo. Sept. 16, 2014) (acknowledging Countrywide’s holding, but finding that the plaintiff had 
failed to allege the requisite nexus between the funds that Freddie Mac received from the 
government and the funds that Freddie Mac used to pay the alleged false claim). 
 39. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (2012). 
 40. Id. 
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The seminal case applying the FCA’s Tax Bar is United States ex 
rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Markets, Inc.41 There, the Second 
Circuit held that the purpose of the Tax Bar was straightforward—to 
prevent qui tam enforcement of the tax code.42 Lissack involved FCA 
claims related to a complicated “yield-burning” scheme that deprived 
the government of no-cost borrowing and caused it to pay excess 
interest on Treasury securities.43 The question presented was whether 
the Tax Bar applied “where the relator does not, strictly speaking, seek 
to recover federal taxes, but where the falsity of the underlying claim 
depends upon a violation of the Tax Code.”44 Concluding that the 
purpose of the Tax Bar was to preserve the exclusive authority of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to enforce the tax code, the Second 
Circuit fashioned a two-prong test that precluded Lissack’s FCA action 
because: (1) the “falsity of the claim . . . depends entirely upon 
establishing a violation of the Tax Code,” and (2) “the IRS has 
authority to recover” the amount sought in the FCA action.45 
Lissack’s two-part test thus effectively only precludes FCA claims 
concerning frauds that are perpetrated by taxpayers. Accordingly, the 
Tax Bar presents no obstacle to using the FCA to combat fraud against 
taxpayers—i.e., fraud of a third party who targets taxpayer funds that 
have been subsidized by government tax expenditures.46 
II.  TAX EXPENDITURES 
The current form of the FCA serves as a potentially formidable 
tool for combatting what we characterize as tax-expenditure fraud. 
Tax-expenditure fraud is accomplished by submitting a false request or 
demand for payment to a taxpayer that will be satisfied by the taxpayer 
using funds that are linked to a credit or deduction granted to the 
taxpayer under the tax code. Following the 2009 amendments designed 
to eliminate the presentment-to-government requirement in the 
context of claims made to contractors, grantees, and other recipients of 
 
 41. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Glob. Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 42. See id. at 152–53 (“[The Tax Bar] was intended to codify case law existing before the 
1986 amendment, which reserved discretion to prosecute tax violations to the IRS and barred 
FCA actions based on tax violations.”). 
 43. Id. at 151. 
 44. Id. at 153. 
 45. Id. at 157. 
 46. For a discussion explaining why tax-expenditure fraud need not implicate the FCA’s Tax 
Bar in the context of a particular case, see infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
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federal money, the FCA now arguably protects the government against 
fraud related to government spending in the form of tax expenditures. 
The concept of tax expenditures first came to prominence on 
November 15, 1967, when Stanley Surrey, the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury for Tax Policy, gave a speech that called for the creation 
of a “tax expenditure budget” to obtain a full accounting of the effects 
of the tax system on federal budgeting.47 Since Surrey brought 
attention to the concept, both the federal government and more than 
two-thirds of the states have produced regular tax-expenditure 
budgets.48 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
defines tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable to provisions 
of the federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a 
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”49 Tax 
expenditures, therefore, are the costs borne by the government of 
preferential reductions in tax liabilities that arise from specific 
provisions of the tax code. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation notes that tax expenditures are 
“analogous to direct outlay programs and may be considered 
alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives.”50 
Because tax expenditures are available to all recipients who meet the 
required statutory criteria, programs funded by tax expenditures are 
“similar to direct spending programs that function as entitlements.”51 
Tax expenditures can be measured by “the difference between tax 
liability under present law and the tax liability that would result from a 
recomputation of tax without benefit of the tax expenditure provision,” 
or, alternately, as an “outlay equivalent”—“the dollar size of a direct 
spending program that would provide taxpayers with net benefits that 
 
 47. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 3–4 (1973).  
 48. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 323 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(2)(E) 
(2012)); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGETS AND 
REPORTS: BEST PRACTICES 1 (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/task_forces/Tax_
Expenditure_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA25-23HS]. 
 49. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 
88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3)). 
 50. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019, at 2 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func+startdown
&id=4857 [https://perma.cc/6QH4-VKLC]. 
 51. Id. at 21. 
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would equal what they now receive from a tax expenditure.”52 In fiscal 
year 2014, the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that 
the sum of revenue losses attributable to tax expenditures was nearly 
$1.17 trillion—essentially the equivalent of all federal discretionary 
direct spending.53 The Office of Management and Budget identified 
some of the largest tax-expenditure programs in fiscal year 2016 as the 
exclusion from taxation of employer contributions for medical 
insurance premiums and medical care ($211 billion), the exclusion 
from taxation of net imputed rental income ($101 billion), the 
preferential taxation of certain capital gains ($93 billion), and the home 
mortgage interest deduction ($62 billion).54 
An example may help to illustrate the equivalency between tax 
expenditures and direct-outlay programs. Suppose that an individual 
has a gross income of $100 and the tax rate is 30 percent. Further 
suppose that there are two possible scenarios: either the government 
gives a tax credit of $20 for eligible medical expenses, or the 
government provides a direct, nontaxable subsidy of $20 for the same 
eligible medical expenses. Table 1 below illustrates the effect of the 
government’s choice of funding mechanism on both the taxpayer’s 
income and the federal budget under each scenario. 
  
 
 52. Id. at 21 & n.27. 
 53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHART OF DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, 
MANDATORY SPENDING AND REVENUE LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TAX EXPENDITURES FROM 
1984 TO 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664912.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D4U-R5X4].  
 54. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 243, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/spec.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT29-89UH]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, TAX EXPENDITURES, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/ap_14_expenditures.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5EX-UAQX]. 
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Table 1. Economic Equivalence of Tax Expenditures and Direct 
Subsidies 
 Scenario A:  
Tax Expenditure 
Scenario B: 
Direct Nontaxable Subsidy 
Taxpayer’s Gross Income $100  $100  
Tax Paid to Government 
(at 30 Percent of Gross Income)  ($30)  ($30) 
Tax Expenditure Received    $20  N/A 
Net Tax Paid to Government  ($10)  ($30) 
Taxpayer’s After-Tax Income $90  $70  
Direct (Tax-Free) Subsidy 
Received   N/A  $20 
Taxpayer’s Ultimate Net Income $90  $90  
Government’s Ultimate Net 
Revenue   $10  $10 
 
In Scenario A, the government collects $30 in taxes from the 
individual. But the medical tax credit of $20 reduces the net taxes 
collected by the government to $10. The taxpayer pays a net $10 to the 
government and keeps a net $90. 
In Scenario B, the government again collects $30 in taxes from the 
individual. But this time the government pays $20 to the taxpayer in 
the form of its direct medical subsidy. The end result again leaves the 
government with $10, and the taxpayer with $90. 
Comparing these two scenarios shows that, for both the taxpayer 
and the government, a tax expenditure of $20 is the economic 
equivalent of the government giving out $20 directly.55 
III.  APPLYING THE FCA TO PROTECT AGAINST 
TAX-EXPENDITURE FRAUD 
Although FCA actions have traditionally addressed fraud related 
only to direct payments by the federal government,56 or the fraudulent 
 
 55. Politically, of course, the two programs are not equivalent, as has already been remarked 
upon. See supra note 4. Congress might prefer to adopt the tax expenditure to replace an already-
existing direct subsidy, since doing so will appear to cut spending (and taxes) and generally will 
not harm the subsidy’s current constituency. 
 56. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996). The Anton 
court explains: 
  The archetypal qui tam FCA action is filed by an insider at a private company who 
discovers his employer has overcharged under a government contract. However, FCA 
actions have also been sustained under theories of supplying substandard products or 
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retention of money directly owed to the government,57 we argue that 
the FCA’s protection should also extend to false claims for payments 
made against funds that the government has subsidized indirectly 
through tax expenditures. 
We appreciate that taxpayers who are defrauded of funds in their 
possession may already have ways to vindicate their rights individually, 
including traditional contract and tort causes of action. However, 
taxpayers face growing practical difficulties in pursuing such traditional 
claims, in part due to the widespread use of arbitration clauses that 
prohibit litigation altogether,58 and in part because of judicial 
acceptance of contractual class-action waivers that can eliminate any 
ability to bring aggregated claims.59 
Thus, using the FCA to target tax-expenditure fraud has certain 
advantages. For example, the government, which is the real party in 
interest in a qui tam FCA suit,60 is not bound by an arbitration clause 
that a qui tam relator has entered into in her personal capacity.61 
Similarly, the government’s unified interest in a large-scale fraud 
targeted at many diffuse recipients of a particular tax expenditure can 
be efficiently litigated by a single qui tam relator, even if the affected 
taxpayers have waived their individual rights to bring class actions. If 
we are correct that the FCA may be invoked to remedy frauds directed 
at government spending in the form of tax expenditures, then the FCA 
not only provides greater protection to the government than courts 
have recognized, but also offers relators a new way to vindicate 
 
services; false negotiation, including bid rigging and defective pricing; and false 
certification.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 57. United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“The ‘reverse false claims’ provision does not eliminate or supplant the FCA’s false 
claim requirement; it rather expands the meaning of a false claim to include statements to avoid 
paying a debt or returning property to the United States.”). 
 58. See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, 
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2808 (2015) (lamenting the 
“mass production of arbitration clauses”). 
 59. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629–30 (2012) (recognizing the 
enforcement gap likely to result from an “impending tsunami of class action waivers”). 
 60. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 930 (2009). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, No. 
214CV01786MMDGWF, 2016 WL 3381220, at *2 (D. Nev. June 13, 2016) (holding that a binding 
arbitration provision signed by a qui tam relator, but not the federal government, did not bind the 
government to arbitrate). 
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individual and class rights as those become increasingly difficult to 
enforce through traditional mechanisms. 
A. The FCA Should Protect Tax Expenditures 
The FCA should be understood to protect the government against 
tax-expenditure fraud to the same degree that the law already protects 
the government against fraud in the context of direct spending. 
In the case of tax expenditures, it is true that money typically does 
not directly flow from the treasury to private individuals.62 However, 
as noted in Part II, tax expenditures are economically equivalent to and 
affect the federal treasury in the same way as direct expenditures.63 
Four dissenting Supreme Court Justices recently emphasized, at 
least in the context of a standing analysis, that there is little economic 
or policy distinction between direct spending and tax expenditures. 
They noted that the “novel distinction in standing law between 
appropriations and tax expenditures has as little basis in principle as it 
has in our precedent. Cash grants and targeted tax breaks are means of 
accomplishing the same government objective—to provide financial 
support to select individuals or organizations.”64 
 
 62. Refundable tax credits are one obvious exception. 
 63. Of course, if the tentative taxes were less than twenty dollars in our example, then the 
effect of the tax credit and the grant would be different. However, even in that case, the effect 
would be to reduce the revenue of the government. 
 64. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 148 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). The Court also explained in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington 
that  
  [b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a 
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. 
Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the 
individual’s contributions. 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); see also Opinion of the 
Justices to the Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Mass. 1987) (noting in the case of Massachusetts tax 
expenditures that “the form of a tax deduction rather than a direct payment out of the 
Commonwealth’s treasury does not alter the result, for it has been recognized that the tax 
subsidies or tax expenditures of this sort are the practical equivalent of direct government 
grants”). Statutory provisions also reflect the view that tax expenditures affect the federal treasury 
in the same way as direct spending. E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(2)(E) (2012) (requiring Congress to 
include “the estimated levels of tax expenditures (the tax expenditures budget) by major items 
and functional categories for the President’s budget” in its own annual concurrent resolution on 
the budget); 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (requiring the President to include “the level of tax 
expenditures under existing law” in the annual budget submitted to Congress). But see Kotterman 
v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 619 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“[The equivalence between tax expenditure 
and direct spending] has not, however, been universally accepted as a doctrine of judicial decision-
making. Even the Supreme Court’s treatment of the concept ‘changes depending on the 
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The Supreme Court has also recognized as a general matter that 
the chief purpose of the FCA is “to provide for restitution to the 
government of money taken from it by fraud.”65 Favoring a very broad 
reading of the FCA, the Supreme Court has noted that “[t]his remedial 
statute reaches beyond ‘claims’ which might be legally enforced, to all 
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of 
money.”66 At the same time, the Court has cautioned that “it is equally 
clear that the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of 
fraud practiced on the Government.”67 Summarizing Supreme Court 
doctrine, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that “only those actions . . . 
which have the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay 
out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally 
deprive the United States of money it is lawfully due, are properly 
considered ‘claims’ within the meaning of the FCA.”68 
 
substantive area of law being considered.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Donna D. Adler, The 
Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in 
Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 857 (1993))).  
 65. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943). The Court has also noted 
that a “Senator discussing these sections said: ‘The government ought to have the privilege of 
coming upon him (a fraudulent contractor) or his estate and his heirs and recovering the money 
of which it is defrauded.’” Id. at 552 (footnote omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d 
Sess. 958 (1863) (statement of Sen. Grimes)). 
 66. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968); see also United States ex 
rel. Jones v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 678 F.3d 72, 85 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[W]e take a broad view 
of what may constitute a false or fraudulent statement to avoid ‘foreclos[ing] FCA liability in 
situations that Congress intended to fall within the Act’s scope.’” (citation omitted)); United 
States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n amending the 
False Claims Act in 1986, Congress emphasized that the scope of false or fraudulent claims should 
be broadly construed.”); United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The 
paradigmatic example of a false claim under the FCA is a false invoice or bill for goods or services. 
The term, however, applies more generally to other demands for government funds.”). 
 67. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958). 
 68. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); 
accord United States ex rel. Shupe v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ases 
reveal[] that courts have limited the FCA’s application to ‘instances of fraud that might result in 
financial loss to the Government.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Sanders v. Am.-Amicable Life 
Ins. Co. of Tex., 545 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008))); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 
F.3d 791, 795–96 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The FCA is not concerned with regulatory noncompliance. 
Rather, it serves a more specific function, protecting the federal fisc by imposing severe penalties 
on those whose false or fraudulent claims cause the government to pay money.”); Hendow, 461 
F.3d at 1174 (“[F]or there to exist a ‘claim’ for purposes of False Claims Act liability, it must 
involve merely some sort of request for the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys 
due.”); Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he [FCA] 
seeks to redress fraudulent activity which attempts to or actually causes economic loss to the 
United States . . . [T]he submission of false claims . . . which do not or would not cause financial 
loss to the government are not within the purview of the [FCA].”); United States v. Azzarelli 
Constr. Co., 647 F.2d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he allegedly false claim must be one that is 
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The economic equivalence between tax expenditures and direct 
outlays suggests that the FCA should naturally be understood to 
extend to claims of fraud that target funds subsidized by tax 
expenditures. Such fraud “intentionally deprive[s] the United States of 
money it is lawfully due.”69 Continuing with the scenarios previously 
discussed, suppose that the individual in Scenario A is a retiree who is 
defrauded of tax-favored retirement funds, while the individual in 
Scenario B is a state agency defrauded of federal disaster-relief funds. 
Both frauds misappropriate government spending. In Scenario A, the 
spending was accomplished through the tax code, whereas in Scenario 
B, the spending was effected as a direct payment. There is no economic 
difference in the two scenarios but for the form.70 
Tax-expenditure fraud should be regarded as equivalent to direct-
expenditure fraud under the FCA for two reasons. First, as already 
discussed, tax expenditures are the economic equivalent, for everyone 
involved, of the government making cash payments. Second, tax 
expenditures have a real impact on the treasury because they reduce 
revenues that the government would otherwise collect. Because the 
purpose of the FCA is to protect the public fisc from fraud, the 
language of the statute should be understood to reach frauds that target 
spending accomplished through the tax code, not just frauds that target 
spending in the form of direct expenditures.71 
 
capable of causing an injury to the funds or property of the United States if the claim is in fact 
paid.”).  
 69. Costner, 153 F.3d at 677 (declining to find this test satisfied where the fraud at issue 
targeted an environmental trust fund that had been created through a litigation settlement in 
which the government participated, but where none of the money came from or was reimbursed 
by the government and the government neither had access to nor control over the fund). 
 70. To clarify, note that the FCA “attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity 
or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment.’” United States v. 
Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 71. See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174 (“[T]he precise logistical details of how the claim is 
made . . . are immaterial. . . . [F]or there to exist a ‘claim’ for purposes of False Claims Act liability, 
it must involve merely some sort of request for the government to pay out money or forfeit 
moneys due.”); United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“The statute requires a causal rather than a temporal connection between fraud and 
payment . . . . If a false statement is integral to a causal chain leading to payment, it is irrelevant 
how the federal bureaucracy has apportioned the statements among layers of paperwork.”); 
Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir. 1975) (“These provisions [of the FCA], 
considered together, indicate a purpose to reach any person who knowingly assisted in causing 
the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that 
person had direct contractual relations with the government.”). 
AYRES & MCGUIRE IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2016  1:07 PM 
552 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:535 
B. Judicial Hostility to the Tax-Expenditure Theory 
Perhaps because the 2009 amendments to the FCA are so recent, 
courts have not often been called on to consider applications of the 
FCA similar to the one we are urging. But when they have done so, 
they have not been especially receptive. Two courts have explicitly 
rejected attempts to apply the FCA to tax expenditures. In Garg v. 
Covanta Holding Corp.,72 the Third Circuit rejected an application of 
the FCA to tax expenditures because the court found that the alleged 
false claim did not sufficiently impact the government program or 
interest at issue.73 In United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, 
N.A.,74 a federal magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colorado applied the reasoning in Garg to conclude that 
alleged false claims made against the tax-subsidized funds in account 
holders’ health savings accounts had no consequence for the 
government or the treasury.75  
1. Garg v. Covanta Holding Corp.  In Garg, the Union County 
Utilities Authority (UCUA), a New Jersey instrumentality designated 
to handle solid waste, issued a series of federal tax-exempt bonds and 
hired Covanta to perform waste-management services.76 Alleging that 
Covanta submitted false claims to the UCUA, Sunil Garg, the 
executive director of the UCUA, filed an FCA claim against Covanta.77 
Espousing a tax-expenditure theory somewhat similar to the one we 
advocate, Garg argued that the UCUA was a federal “grantee” 
because the deductibility of interest on its bonds amounted to a 
financial benefit conferred by the government.78 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the tax exemption for the 
UCUA’s bonds benefited the UCUA (in addition to the bond 
purchasers) because the exemption made the bonds more attractive 
and thus led to the UCUA having “more money in its proverbial 
pocket (thanks to the federal government) than it would if it had to 
 
 72. Garg v. Covanta Holding Corp., 478 F. App’x 736 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 73. Id. at 742. 
 74. United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-00097-RM-CBS (D. 
Colo. Sept. 3, 2015), ECF No. 68. 
 75. Recommendation Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 12 n.11, United States ex 
rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-00097-RM-CBS (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2015), ECF No. 
62 [hereinafter Recommendation]. 
 76. Garg, 478 F. App’x at 738. 
 77. Id. at 738–39. 
 78. Id. at 739. 
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issue non-tax-exempt bonds at a regular interest rate,” as Garg had 
argued.79 But the court rejected Garg’s claim that this indirect benefit 
transformed the UCUA’s own funds into the equivalent of a grant from 
the federal government for purposes of the FCA: 
  Even granting Garg this point—that UCUA has effectively 
received a direct financial subsidy from the federal government—his 
argument still fails. The FCA requires more than fraud against 
anyone who happens to receive money from the federal 
government. . . . 
  Rather, the plain language of the FCA requires that there be some 
greater nexus between the alleged fraud and the government funds.80 
Elaborating on this concept of nexus, the court further explained: 
  The FCA does not apply to fraud against any federal grantee; it 
requires that the specific money or property claimed must be intended 
to “be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a 
Government program or interest.” Furthermore, the federal 
government must also provide at least a portion of the specific 
“money or property requested” or reimburse the grantee for that 
specific demand. These statutory requirements all drive at the same 
point—that “the False Claims Act only prohibits fraudulent claims 
that cause or would cause economic loss to the government.” “[O]nly 
actions which have the purpose and effect of causing the government 
to pay out money are clearly ‘claims’ within the purpose of the Act.”81 
As this passage indicates, the Garg court’s real concern was the 
alleged fraud’s apparent lack of impact on the federal treasury.82 This 
concern certainly appears valid, given the facts that the relator in Garg 
alleged. While the UCUA might have sold more bonds by virtue of the 
bonds’ tax-exempt status, any connection between the proceeds from 
the UCUA’s sale of its bonds, on one hand, and the revenues foregone 
by the federal government as a result of not taxing bondholders on 
 
 79. Id. at 740. 
 80. Id. at 741. 
 81. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
(2012)). 
 82. Any purported lack of government purpose underlying the tax exemption afforded to 
state and local bonds by 26 U.S.C. § 103 cannot justify the Third Circuit’s rejection of Garg’s case 
theory, for it is well established that the tax exemption for such bonds serves a government 
purpose of allowing states and localities to attract investment. See Holley v. United States, 124 
F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 1942) (“Congress established the exemptions in this section of the statute 
to aid in the flotation of government bonds and securities by making them tax free, and therefore 
more attractive to investors.”). 
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their income from those bonds, on the other, seems excessively remote. 
The definition of “claim” under the FCA still requires that the 
government must “(I) . . . ha[ve] provided any portion of the money or 
property requested or demanded; or (II) will reimburse [the] 
contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or 
property which is requested or demanded.”83 The relator in Garg’s 
theory that the government’s conferral of a tax-expenditure benefit on 
bondholders can somehow work to transform a bond issuer into a 
grantee of government money stretches the meaning of “nexus” too 
far. The mere fact that the UCUA partly finances itself through tax-
exempt bonds does not by itself make every fraud against the UCUA 
actionable under the FCA. 
On the basis of Garg’s facts, the Third Circuit correctly concluded 
that the asserted nexus between the funds targeted by Covanta’s fraud 
and the federal treasury was too attenuated to support an FCA claim.84 
However, while the Garg court rejected one application of the tax-
expenditure theory, Garg’s reasoning does not preclude the use of a 
tax-expenditure theory when there is a closer nexus between the funds 
targeted for fraud and federal money. The next case we discuss 
presents just such a fact pattern. 
2. United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A.  In 
Webster, a federal magistrate in the District of Colorado took a 
similarly dim view of the FCA’s application to fraud targeted at a 
collection of private funds that had been subsidized by federal tax 
expenditures.85 In Webster, the relator (who is also one of the authors) 
alleged that the defendant bank violated the FCA by knowingly 
asserting a false contractual entitlement to charge thousands of Health 
Savings Accounts (HSA) under its administration a total of more than 
$1.4 million in illegal monthly account-maintenance fees.86 An HSA is 
a tax-exempt trust established to pay certain qualified medical 
 
 83. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2). 
 84. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). 
The opinion explains:  
[S]tatement or course of conduct must be material to the government’s decision to pay 
out moneys to the claimant. This is plain from our focus on “(1) whether the false 
statement is the cause of the Government’s providing the benefit; and (2) whether any 
relation exists between the subject matter of the false statement and the event 
triggering Government’s [sic] loss.” 
Id. 
 85. Recommendation, supra note 75, at 4.  
 86. Id. 
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expenses; contributions to HSAs can be claimed as tax deductions.87 
The revenue foregone by the government to subsidize and promote the 
private funding of HSAs is therefore an example of a tax expenditure. 
The complaint in Webster alleged that in September 2014, the 
bank illegally instituted account maintenance fees on previously 
exempt HSA balances.88 The bank’s new fee structure was such that 
aggrieved account holders were left with no option but to pay the fees 
or close their accounts—and incur a termination fee even larger than 
the total of the new fees.89 The relator relied on common-law 
unconscionability and the prohibition of unfair practices set out in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act90 as grounds to allege that the new fees 
were unlawful.91 The complaint alleged that the bank’s deduction of 
the fees from the balances of its account holders implied the existence 
of a contractual entitlement to payment of the fees.92 Because this 
implied certification of entitlement to be paid was legally false, the 
bank’s claim on its customers’ tax-subsidized HSA funds was therefore 
a false claim made to a grantee or other recipient of federal money 
under the FCA.93 
The bank moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim under the FCA, relying heavily upon Garg to argue that the 
relator’s tax-expenditure theory failed to allege any harm to the 
government fisc.94 The relator responded that the bank’s confiscation 
of tax-subsidized funds was the equivalent of a false claim targeted at 
a fixed amount of federal grant money in the hands of a private 
grantee.95 The relator also argued that the bank’s conduct did 
nonmonetary damage to the government in the form of “harm to the 
Federal Government’s interest in the administration and integrity of its 
 
 87. 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2012). 
 88. Complaint for Violations of the Federal False Claims Act and of the New York False 
Claims Act and Jury Demand at 20, United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. 
14-cv-00097-RM-CBS (D. Colo. Jan. 1, 2014), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Complaint].  
 89. Id. at 18–19. 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 91. Complaint, supra note 88, at 19–20.  
 92. Id. at 21. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Webster Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Complaint (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) 
and Brief in Support at 17–20, United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, No. 14-cv-00097-
RM-CBS (D. Colo. Aug. 4, 2014), ECF No. 32. 
 95. Relator’s Response to Webster’s Motion to Dismiss at 28–31, United States ex rel. 
McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-00097-RM-CBS (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2014), ECF No. 
35 [hereinafter Relator’s Response]. 
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tax expenditure program that favors the private funding of individual 
health savings accounts in violation of the [FCA].”96 
The magistrate judge was unreceptive to the relator’s tax-
expenditure theory, which he summarized as follows: 
[Relator] postulates that moneys held in a health savings account 
constitute “tax expenditures” and represent the practical equivalent 
of payments by the United States because the corresponding tax 
deductions advance a government policy. As [Relator] explains, 
“every single dollar that is contributed to [a health savings account] is 
a dollar that the Government would have taxed, but has instead 
refrained from taxing. Such dollars fully represent ‘revenue losses’ to 
the Treasury.”97 
Rejecting the claim that a nexus existed between the private funds 
held in HSAs and the public fisc, the magistrate judge noted: 
[T]he Complaint in this case does not describe any actions or 
statements by Webster Bank that would meet the definition of 
“claim,” or allege any facts that suggest the United States 
Government either received a demand for payment related to 
[Relator’s] health savings account or provided any of the funds in the 
Relator’s account.98 
He explained, “it is reasonable to conclude that Congress believes 
that encouraging health-related savings is a laudable policy objective 
that can be promoted by providing tax-incentives to the same taxpayers 
who fund the savings accounts. Those tax-incentives do not transform 
the account balances into ‘federal funds’ or payments by the 
government.”99 
Persuaded by the bank’s view of the reasoning in Garg, the 
magistrate judge held that a “fair reading of the Complaint makes clear 
that [the Relator] is attempting to transform a garden variety breach of 
contract or fraud claim against Webster Bank into a scheme to defraud 
the government. The FCA cannot be applied so broadly.”100 Of 
particular significance to the magistrate was the fact that “under the 
Relator’s ‘tax expenditure’ theory . . . any potential revenue losses to 
 
 96. Recommendation, supra note 75, at 5 (quoting Complaint, supra note 88, at 30).  
 97. Id. at 11–12 (third alteration in original) (quoting Relator’s Response, supra note 95, at 
20). 
 98. Id. at 9. 
 99. Id. at 13. 
 100. Id. at 14. 
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the Treasury occurred at the time [the Relator] lawfully contributed to 
his health savings account. . . . [A]ny subsequent withdrawals from that 
same account . . . had no tax consequences for [the Relator] or the 
Treasury.”101 
But one of the reasons why Congress amended the FCA in 1986 
was to foreclose precisely such determinations that fraud against funds 
already in the hands of a third party could not impact the treasury. 
Prior to the 1986 amendments, fraud against fixed sums of government 
money in the hands of third-party grantees had been held not to impact 
the treasury and, therefore, not to implicate the FCA’s protections. In 
United States v. Azzarelli Construction Co.,102 contractors involved in a 
highway construction project were accused of defrauding the state of 
Illinois by engaging in a bid-rigging conspiracy.103 The Seventh Circuit 
held that an FCA action could not proceed against the contractors; 
because the federal contribution to the state highway project was a 
fixed sum, the treasury could not possibly be impacted by a fraud that 
did nothing to affect the size of the federal contribution.104 Congress 
disagreed with this reasoning. When Congress amended the FCA in 
1986, it expressly noted its intention to overturn Azzarelli by defining 
the term “claim” to include requests for money submitted to federal 
“grantees,” thereby ensuring that the FCA covered fraud against 
“State, local or private programs funded in part by the United States 
where there [was] significant Federal regulation and involvement.”105 
The government’s tax expenditure in Webster is conceptually 
indistinguishable from the fixed grant made to the state of Illinois in 
Azzarelli. Both expenditures impacted the treasury in a fixed amount 
and did so independently of the fraud at issue in the case. Neither 
expenditure increased as a result of the fraud directed at the third-party 
grantee or other recipient. The definition of “claim” at issue in Webster 
was materially the same as the definition Congress adopted to overrule 
the result in Azzarelli. Accordingly, if the false claims in Azzarelli are 
now actionable under the FCA, then the false claims alleged in Webster 
 
 101. Id. at 12 n.11. 
 102. United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 647 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 103. Id. at 758. 
 104. Id. at 760–62. 
 105. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. NO. 
99-345, at 22 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (“Thus, the Committee intends 
the new subsection (d) to overrule Azzarelli and similar cases which have limited the ability of 
the United States to use the act to reach fraud perpetrated on federal grantees, contractors or 
other recipients of Federal funds.”). 
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should be too, so long as tax expenditures are properly regarded as 
equivalent to direct spending. 
On this point, it is problematic that the magistrate in Webster did 
not give any weight to the economic equivalency between tax 
expenditures and direct spending. He chose to focus instead on the 
difference in timing between when the tax expenditure impacted the 
treasury and when the alleged fraud affected the relator’s tax-
subsidized funds. 
As illustrated by Scenarios A and B above, there is no economic 
difference between the government granting the relator a tax 
deduction for the amount of the relator’s private contribution into an 
HSA and the government making a direct payment to reimburse the 
relator for a certain portion of the relator’s contribution. On what 
rational basis should the government’s reduction in revenue due to 
allowing a deduction of the relator’s contribution into an HSA not be 
protected by the FCA if the government’s direct reimbursement of an 
equivalent portion of the same contribution plainly would be 
protected? False claims targeting a fixed amount of tax-subsidized 
funds in an HSA do the same kind of harm to the treasury—and to the 
government’s programmatic interests—as did the false claims in 
Azzarelli, which targeted a fixed amount of directly subsidized funds.106 
Based on the language of the FCA, it does not matter whether the 
false claim against the relator’s tax-subsidized funds only occurred 
after the tax subsidy for the relator’s HSA contributions impacted the 
treasury. Nothing in the statute imposes such a temporal limitation.107 
The very same timing issue (that is, fraud occurring after the impact on 
the public fisc) arises whenever a grantee is defrauded of grant funds 
that the government has previously disbursed. The timing of a false 
claim’s impact on the treasury simply does not matter;108 all that does 
matter for claims made to contractors, grantees, and other recipients 
 
 106. In explaining the 1986 legislative amendments to the FCA that overruled Azzarelli, 
courts have recognized that “the Senate Judiciary Committee made clear that it intended the 
concept of loss to the United States to be considered broadly.” United States ex rel. Yesudian v. 
Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., id. (“Congress, then, plainly 
regarded a false claim as causing a loss to the United States in the Azzarelli situation, 
notwithstanding that the false claim would not lead to an additional pay-out of federal funds.”). 
 107. Moreover, courts have expressly rejected any requirement for a temporal connection 
between fraud and payment. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 71. 
 108. Indeed, recovery under the FCA does not require the government to actually sustain any 
monetary damages at all. Varljen v. Cleveland Gear Co., 250 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2001). Only 
the potential for the treasury to be impacted must be present. See Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman 
& Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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of government money is that the government “provides,” “has 
provided,” or “will reimburse . . . any portion of the money or property 
which is requested or demanded.”109 
The economic equivalence of tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures, coupled with the fact that the federal government allows 
deductions for HSA contributions for the public purpose of 
encouraging private funding of HSAs, suggests that the kind of fraud 
alleged in Webster should be actionable under the FCA.110 
C. Concerns with the Tax-Expenditure Theory 
Garg and Webster stand as obstacles to the proposition that FCA 
claims properly include fraud directed at private funds in private hands 
that are, in substance, subsidized by government tax expenditures. 
However, the economic equivalency between direct government 
expenditures, which unquestionably fall under the scope of the FCA, 
and spending accomplished through tax expenditures suggests that 
both forms of government spending should receive the FCA’s 
protections. This outcome best serves the FCA’s intended purpose of 
“provid[ing] for restitution to the government of money taken from it 
by fraud.”111 
The courts’ most serious concern about applying the FCA to tax 
expenditures seems to be that it would unduly expand the scope of the 
FCA and open a floodgate of litigation. Indeed, the Garg court wrote: 
[If we accept the tax-expenditure theory] the scope of the FCA would 
be enormous. Nearly every adult American receives a “subsidy” from 
the federal government, be it direct or indirect. In the tax realm alone, 
every taxpaying American receives some form of exemption or 
deduction, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, the 
charitable contributions deduction, or even simply the standard 
deduction. Just like the tax-exempt bonds, the government’s decision 
to grant these deductions is a matter of grace, and the money saved 
by these deductions goes straight to the bottom-line of the American 
taxpayer. Moreover, some of us receive our paychecks from the 
 
 109. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012). 
 110. Given the decision of the United States to decline intervention, the court’s evident 
displeasure with the tax-expenditure theory, and the defendant’s request for fee shifting, the 
relator ultimately opted to dismiss the Webster case voluntarily, rather than pursue it to a 
potentially adverse final judgment. Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 
at 4, United States ex rel. McGuire v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-00096-RM-CBS (D. Colo. 
Sep. 3, 2015), ECF No. 68.  
 111. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943).  
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federal government. That does not mean, however, that every fraud 
against a government employee or taxpayer supports a claim under 
the FCA.112 
The objection that using the FCA against tax-expenditure fraud 
will expand the statute beyond appropriate limits is unwarranted. For 
one thing, when Garg was decided the FCA already defined “claim” in 
a manner that excluded fraud directed at federal salaries and 
unrestricted income subsidies from the law’s reach.113 For another 
thing, the FCA already has a very broad reach with respect to direct 
expenditures.114 Concerns similar to those expressed in Garg have  
been raised in the context of direct expenditures—and properly 
rejected—because courts understand that “Congress means what it 
says and thus the statutory language is normally the best evidence of 
congressional intent.”115 
However, to the extent that the Third Circuit’s concerns in Garg 
are shared by sister courts considering whether the FCA applies to tax-
expenditure fraud, solace may be found in two other constraints that 
 
 112. Garg v. Covanta Holding Corp., 478 F. App’x 736, 741 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Hutchins, 
253 F.3d at 184 n.5. The Hutchins court explained that  
  [e]xtending the False Claims Act to reach any false statement made to the 
government, regardless of any impact on the United States Treasury, would appear to 
impermissibly expand standing doctrine and essentially permit any plaintiff to sue on 
behalf of the government when false or misleading statements are made to any 
government agent including the courts, the legislature or any law enforcement officer. 
Id.  
 113. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(B). 
 114. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 763 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (imposing liability for selling cigarettes to corporate affiliates at prices lower than the 
contractual most-favored-customer pricing offered to military exchanges); United States v. Sci. 
Applications Intern. Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (imposing liability for failure to 
avoid and disclose conflicts of interest per contractual requirements); United States ex rel. Longhi 
v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 467–68 (5th Cir. 2009) (imposing liability for a false statement 
about small-business eligibility in a grant proposal even when no false claims for payment were 
submitted); United States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that liability for a reverse false claim could arise from avoiding government fees by 
correcting meat export certificates rather than obtaining new ones); United States ex rel. Krahling 
v. Merck & Co., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 581, 594 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (imposing liability for failure to 
disclose material information about safety and efficacy of vaccine while submitting claims for 
payment for government’s purchase of the vaccine); Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. 
Supp. 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (imposing liability for making a false record that was material to 
the recordmaker’s obligation to pay fines to the government, where a tugboat captain failed to 
record the discharge of a pollutant into the Ohio River in violation of the Clean Water Act). 
 115. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., No. C-95-1825-VRW, 1998 
WL 230979, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1998) (“Defendants’ policy arguments regarding the 
potentially limitless reach of the False Claims Act under this reading of § 3729(c) should be 
addressed to Congress, not the court.”). 
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exist within the statute and that can be relied upon to prevent any 
excessively broad application of the FCA. First, the FCA requires 
scienter,116 so false statements must be knowingly false. Second, the 
FCA requires that the falsity of a claim be material to the payment 
decision of the government or (in the tax-expenditure context) the 
defrauded taxpayer.117 
The materiality requirement, in particular, is sufficient to cabin 
the FCA to reasonable applications. As the Supreme Court has 
recently held, “[t]he materiality standard is demanding,”118 and a 
finding of materiality requires more than minor or insubstantial 
noncompliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement that has been designated to be a condition of payment.119 
Materiality, moreover, is a concept that would readily apply to 
evaluating whether the funds targeted by the fraud in a tax-expenditure 
claim under the FCA have any meaningful connection to, and thus any 
impact on, the treasury. 
The FCA’s definition of “claim” should be read in a way that not 
only reflects economic substance, but also promotes the purposes for 
which the statute was enacted in the first place. Given the scienter and 
materiality requirements that apply in all FCA cases, a floodgate of 
litigation is unlikely to open as a result of recognizing that false claims 
against funds subsidized by tax expenditures are properly within the 
ambit of the FCA’s protection. 
To the extent that a limiting principle must be articulated in 
anticipation of courts’ concerns about the potential breadth of applying 
the FCA to tax-expenditure frauds, the concept of nexus, touched on 
by Garg, appears to serve best. Requiring a sufficiently strong nexus 
between a tax expenditure and the funds used to pay a false claim will 
permit courts to screen FCA cases for overly attenuated connections 
to federal money, like the thin connection that the court rejected in 
 
 116. Hindo v. Univ. of Health Scis./Chi. Med. Sch., 65 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Turning 
to the substantive issue in this case, the False Claims Act imposes liability on one who ‘knowingly 
presents’ to the United States government ‘a false or fraudulent claim for payment’ . . . . Innocent 
mistakes or negligence are not actionable under this section.” (citation omitted) (quoting 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012))). 
 117. See United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 15-1502, 2016 WL 3031099, at *4–5 
(7th Cir. May 27, 2016) (“Kmart’s misstatements had to be ‘capable of influencing [] the 
decisionmaking body to which [they were] addressed.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999))). 
 118. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016).  
 119. Id. 
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Garg. Nexus is a concept with which courts are well acquainted, and 
fashioning appropriate boundaries on the basis of nexus is an exercise 
that courts should be quite comfortable performing. Under a nexus 
test, an FCA action based on the facts in Garg would not be sustainable 
because an insufficient nexus exists between the tax expenditure at 
issue (a tax exemption granted to purchasers of the UCUA’s bonds) 
and the funds that were used to pay the false claims (the UCUA’s own 
revenues from all sources). In contrast, an FCA action based on the 
facts in Webster would be sustainable because a much closer nexus 
exists between the relevant tax expenditure (a tax deduction granted 
to HSA beneficiaries tied to the size of their contributions into a 
segregated account) and the funds used to pay the alleged false claims 
(the actual funds residing in that segregated account). 
Finally, it is important to clarify why the FCA’s Tax Bar would not 
apply to many tax-expenditure frauds. Recall that in Lissack,120 the test 
for determining whether the Tax Bar deprives a court of jurisdiction 
over an FCA case asks (1) whether establishing the “falsity of the 
claim . . . depends entirely upon establishing a violation of the Tax 
Code,” and (2) whether “the IRS has authority to recover” the funds 
sought.121 
Under this two-prong test, some FCA cases involving fraud 
directed at government spending done through tax expenditures may 
be barred, but other cases will certainly be permitted to proceed. Tax 
expenditures, after all, are only incidentally about taxes; they are 
primarily about spending. Whenever a fraud involving tax 
expenditures is not subject to an enforcement action by the IRS, which 
would likely be true in many cases in which the fraudfeasor is someone 
other than the taxpayer, the Tax Bar will not apply because the fraud 
itself does not involve any violation of the tax code. In Webster, for 
example, the relator argued that the bank’s alleged false claims against 
HSA funds had no connection to the tax code and, in fact, involved 
matters that the IRS itself expressly regarded to be matters of private 
contract between the taxpayer and the HSA administrator.122 Because 
the magistrate held that the relator failed to state a claim under the 
 
 120. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 121. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Glob. Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145, 157 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 122. Relator’s Response, supra note 95, at 21–22. 
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FCA, the court did not reach the issue of whether the Tax Bar applied, 
and the relator’s argument went unaddressed.123 
In sum, Garg and Webster should not prevent the use of the FCA 
to attack false claims directed at funds subsidized by government tax 
expenditures. Garg is entirely consistent with our understanding of the 
FCA, and we would respectfully argue that Webster was wrongly 
decided. 
D. Potential Applications 
The legal requirements for scienter and materiality under the 
FCA, as well as our proposed requirement that there be a sufficient 
nexus between the defrauded funds and the treasury, combine to 
prevent our tax-expenditure theory from being applied in a manner 
that might transform a “garden variety breach of contract or fraud 
claim . . . into a scheme to defraud the government.”124 In addition, 
many imaginable kinds of fraud “against a government employee or 
taxpayer” would not support FCA claims even under our theory.125 
On the other hand, a broad variety of frauds that are inimical to 
the government’s tax-expenditure goals would, under our theory, be 
newly actionable. Indeed, the Office of Management and Budget’s list 
of 169 different tax expenditures suggests a plethora of possibilities.126 
For example, the size of federal tax expenditures attributable to 
allowing deduction of employer contributions for medical insurance 
premiums and medical care was nearly $211 billion in 2016. Provider 
frauds that involve inflating the costs of covered healthcare could be 
actionable under a tax-expenditure theory of the FCA. Similarly, the 
cost of federal tax expenditures for the home mortgage interest 
deduction was $62 billion in 2016. Lender frauds that involve inflating 
the costs of mortgage loans could be pursued under our theory. Tax 
expenditures that subsidize private contributions to individual 
retirement accounts totaled nearly $17 billion in 2016. Account 
providers that fraudulently inflate account fees could be subject to 
FCA actions under our theory. Finally, tax expenditures attributable 
 
 123. Recommendation, supra note 75, at 5 n.9. 
 124. Id. at 14. 
 125. Garg v. Covanta Holding Corp., 478 F. App’x 736, 741 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 126. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra note 
54, at 243; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, TAX EXPENDITURES, 
supra note 54.  
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to charitable contributions exceeded $10 billion in 2016. Frauds 
targeting the tax-subsidized funds accumulated in charities could be 
actionable as tax-expenditure frauds. 
Other potential examples abound. The common thread in these 
few imagined examples is a third-party fraudster who knowingly and 
materially defrauds a taxpayer of funds that the government has 
economically subsidized by means of tax expenditures. Under our tax-
expenditure theory, the FCA would be available as a remedy for such 
frauds. The Tax Bar would not be an obstacle, for in the cases we 
imagine above, the defrauded taxpayer is not falsely reporting anything 
to the IRS—indeed, the taxpayer (like the government) is a victim of 
the fraud. Just as FCA actions lie when government grantees are 
hoodwinked into paying too much for grant-related goods and services, 
so too should the FCA be invoked when recipients of tax credits and 
deductions are hoodwinked into paying too much for tax-expenditure-
related goods and services. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued for an understanding of the FCA that construes 
the term “claim” in a way that both reflects economic reality and 
promotes the FCA’s purpose of protecting government money. 
Recognizing that tax expenditures are the substantive equivalent of 
direct expenditures for all relevant purposes under the FCA will 
achieve this result. 
While we have made out a plausible claim that a broad variety of 
tax-expenditure frauds can be reached by the existing FCA, our 
argument might also be reframed as a call for law reform. Even if 
judicial reluctance ultimately means that the FCA as currently written 
cannot be invoked to attack tax-expenditure fraud, the law should be 
strengthened by Congress so that it can. The FCA’s definition of 
“claim” might be usefully amended to eliminate any doubt that tax-
expenditure frauds are within the scope of the statute. Such a reform 
would be consistent with the history of amendments that have 
systematically expanded the scope of the FCA’s protection of the 
public fisc. Finally, while this Article has focused on the FCA as a 
vehicle for vindicating tax-expenditure fraud, an analogous exercise 
might be undertaken with regard to other whistleblower mechanisms, 
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such as the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program.127 Recognition of the 
economic equivalence between tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures need not be confined to the context of the FCA alone. 
Our approach to the FCA is a relatively untested one. Few courts 
have analyzed whether a false claim made against funds that have been 
effectively subsidized by tax expenditures may give rise to an 
actionable claim under the FCA. Our argument that tax-expenditure 
fraud does properly lie within the FCA’s scope is consistent with both 
the language and the purpose of the statute. Our approach has the 
benefit of permitting taxpayers, in their capacity as qui tam relators, to 
vindicate fraud claims that may otherwise be unavailable in the face of 
binding arbitration clauses and contractual class-action waivers. At the 
same time, our reading of the FCA empowers the federal government 
to protect more than one trillion dollars of spending that is 
accomplished through the tax code. We urge courts to consider, and 
practitioners to explore, the possibilities. 
 
 127. Final Rules Implementing Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249 (2015). The IRS also has a whistleblower mechanism 
provided by statute, 16 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2012), and implemented in the regulations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 301.7623-1 (2015), but the IRS program is unlikely to be an effective mechanism for addressing 
third-party tax-expenditure fraud when the taxpayer is a victim of the fraud, rather than its 
perpetrator. 
